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
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IN THE 1980's.**

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**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania**

**US POLICY AND EAST ASIAN SECURITY
IN THE 1980's**

by

Thomas L. Wilborn

1 February 1981

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
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FOREWORD

This memorandum examines probable US interests in East Asia in the 1980's. The author describes present US policies and suggests possible American options to deal with problems related to Kampuchea, Japanese attitudes toward defense, developments in South Korea, and political instability within certain East Asian nations. American interests in East Asia—economic, political, and strategic—are portrayed as important, particularly if military deployments into the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf are contemplated, and they are threatened by the growing military forces of the Soviet Navy and Air Force. The author recommends courses of action which, except for the Kampuchean problem, are consistent with recent and current policy. He suggests that a solution to the Kampuchean situation may require American initiatives, including normalization of relations with Hanoi.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



JACK N. MERRITT
Major General, USA
Commandant

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. THOMAS L. WILBORN has been with the Strategic Studies Institute since 1974. He earned a bachelor's degree in journalism and master's degree and doctorate in political science from the University of Kentucky. In addition to teaching political science and international relations at Madison College and Central Missouri State University, his professional background includes a position with the University of Kentucky educational assistance program at Bandung, Indonesia. Dr. Wilborn is the author of several research memoranda on nuclear strategy and Southeast Asia and has written book reviews published in professional journals.

SUMMARY

US policies in East Asia in the 1980's will help shape the events which take place, but also will respond to events over which the United States has little or no control. After surveying current and probable US interests and current US policy, this paper analyzes the following four important situations calling for the attention of US policymakers: the status of Kampuchea; Japanese attitudes toward defense; political, economic, and military trends in South Korea; and threats to internal political stability among non-Communist, developing states of the region.

The continuation of fighting in Kampuchea is not in America's interest, and can probably only be ended during the 1980's as a result of a political compromise which results in a sizeable reduction of Vietnamese troops in the country and a lessening of Vietnamese dependency on the Soviet Union. A US offer to normalize relations with Hanoi may be necessary to achieve such a compromise.

The United States should welcome the trends toward greater concern for defense in Japan without appearing to apply pressure for greater defense budgets. An honest effort to manage the balance of trade problems between the two nations is essential to prevent political tensions that would make security cooperation—now improving—more difficult. Americans working with US-Japanese security affairs should become more sensitive to Japanese culture and ways of thinking.

In the next decade, South Korea, with its dynamic economy, could overcome the military advantages now enjoyed by North Korea. If so, the question of the deployment of US forces in South Korea will be raised anew. If justified, withdrawals of American forces should only take place after full consultation with South Korea, Japan, and others. The forces should be redeployed in or near the Pacific area.

As most of East Asia is composed of developing nations, there is a strong likelihood of political upheavals which could threaten US interests. Sound judgements based on good intelligence and analysis will be required to allocate support and assistance to benefit the populations, strengthen friends, and maintain friendly relations with new governments if they emerge.

US POLICY AND EAST ASIAN SECURITY IN THE 1980's

US relations toward East Asia¹ were turbulent during the 1970's. The Communist regime in China, branded as illegitimate by the United States when it assumed control over the mainland in 1949, was extended all but full diplomatic relations in 1972. An ally with whom the United States—the strongest nation in the world—had fought a long and frustrating war was abandoned, and quickly overthrown by Communist forces that a series of American Presidents had set out to defeat. And many observers, both Asian and American, spoke of the United States, which had 740,000 military personnel in East Asia, as having “withdrawn” from the region when the numbers shrunk to 106,800.² When President Carter announced that he would fulfill his campaign pledge and remove 40,000 combat troops from Korea, additional voices questioned the intentions and directions of American policy in Asia.

At the end of the decade, however, developments suggested that Americans—especially members of the new administration and the Congress—had sufficiently overcome the trauma of Vietnam to recognize American interests in East Asia and wanted to protect them against potentially threatening developments. Therefore, as the Sino-Soviet confrontation intensified and relations between

Beijing-backed Democratic Kampuchea and Soviet-backed Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) worsened, US attention to ASEAN increased. The United States provided assistance to the hundreds of thousands of refugees who began fleeing Vietnam in 1978, and increased the number to be resettled within the country. Near the end of 1978, China and the United States agreed to establish full diplomatic relations, and shortly thereafter significantly increased political, economic, and cultural interchanges. Also in December 1978, agreements were reached with the Philippines which provided for continued, unrestricted use of the Subic Naval Station and Clark Air Base. Finally, shortly after President Carter visited Korea in June of 1979, the withdrawal of forces from Korea was frozen (to be reconsidered in 1981) after only one battalion had been removed. While some critics still maintain that US policies toward Asia lack consistency, clarity, and conviction,³ the level of activity of the United States and the repeated proclamations that the United States will perform a responsible role in Asia have served, although only partially, to dissipate the confusion about US goals and actions which was widely expressed a few years ago.

It could be argued that much of America's increased attention to East Asia probably has been due to the response to the action of others rather than new initiatives by the US Government. In the last few years, East Asia has been the scene of open conflict and intense diplomatic maneuvering. The main facts of the Third Indochina War are well-known, and will only be briefly summarized here. After a series of border skirmishes, apparently initiated by Pol Pot's forces, which continued with relatively high intensity for at least a year, the SRV launched a full-scale invasion of Kampuchea on Christmas day, 1978. By January 7, Phnom Penh was "liberated" with all other cities falling to Vietnamese troops in a short time. Perhaps 60,000 troops loyal to Pol Pot—out of approximately 100,000 in uniform before the invasion—escaped from the North Vietnamese forces and began guerrilla warfare against the invaders. Those who still remain—probably half of the original number⁴—together with smaller, non-Communist forces, still are engaged in guerrilla activities from their bases along the Thai-Kampuchean border. The second phase of the war was a much shorter affair, beginning on February 17 with Chinese attacks into Vietnam and ending March 16, after heavy casualties to Chinese forces and extensive economic damage in the border areas of

Vietnam, when China proclaimed that its objectives had been met, and withdrew.

The effects of the diplomatic developments of 1978 will be more lasting than the related conflicts briefly referred to in the preceding paragraph. As the tension between Vietnam, on the one hand, and Kampuchea and China, on the other hand, increased, with virtually no possibilities for the SRV to obtain any support against its adversaries from the West, Vietnam became increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union, almost its only source of military and economic assistance. In June, Vietnam became a member of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, the economic association for Soviet bloc states, and in November, shortly before Kampuchea was invaded, a treaty of friendship and cooperation with provisions for military cooperation was signed with the Soviet Union. In the meantime, the PRC and Japan concluded a lengthy negotiation process and signed a treaty of peace and friendship which contained the famous "antihegemony" clause strenuously objected to by the Soviet Union. Japan denied that the treaty was directed against any third party, including the Soviet Union, but it was clear that Tokyo had decided to tilt heavily toward Beijing.

While these maneuvers by the major powers and Vietnam were taking place, the states of ASEAN, confronted with thousands of refugees fleeing Vietnam and Kampuchea and the threat that Vietnam might allow the fighting to extend into Thailand, achieved new levels of unity in opposition to Vietnam and its superpower supporter. The final noteworthy diplomatic event was the full normalization of relations between China and the United States. Except for Burma, still maintaining its neutrality; Taiwan, without a clear status in the wake of the US-PRC action; and North Korea, the last remaining Communist state of Asia with connections to both Beijing and Moscow, all of the states of East Asia were polarized over the conflicts of Indochina and the underlying Sino-Soviet dispute at the opening of the 1980's.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze US policies in East Asia with a view of highlighting possible security policy choices which may be present in the 1980's. It must be emphasized that "East Asia" is only a term of convenience, and not a homogenous region with fairly uniform cultural and political characteristics. For all the differences among French, German, and English societies, it is still often appropriate to conceptualize in terms of European attitudes,

problems, and responses. But there is no East Asian sense of identity, no East Asian set of characteristics, and no East Asian cluster of attitudes. To the contrary, in East Asia there is diversity in virtually every dimension. Quite properly, then, except in the most general sense, this analysis will not discover or recommend a single, grand design of US policy toward East Asia. There must be distinct, if highly interrelated, policies for different nations and subregions and different issues.

The balance of the essay is organized into three parts. America's stakes in East Asia will be described, and current policies examined. Then, some possible changes in the region during the decade which could affect US policy will be discussed, and policy options for the 1980's will be examined.

AMERICA'S STAKE IN EAST ASIA

The interests of the United States in East Asia are considerable. The assertion by Ambassador to Japan Mansfield, the former majority leader of the Senate, that the Northwest Pacific area is more important to the United States than Western Europe⁵ may involve some hyperbole, but East Asia clearly seems too important to the United States to have been relegated to "third or fourth place in American foreign policy priorities," even when the higher priorities include "European security issues, the strategic balance, and the Middle East."⁶ The major power centers of the world—United States, Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the European Community—interact continuously in the region, the role of Western Europe increasing in significance as those nations begin to participate in the modernization of China and the dynamic economies of non-Communist Asia, including ASEAN. East Asia contains almost one and one-half billion people, not including the population of Soviet Asia,⁷ the second largest economy of the world in terms of GNP; and almost half of the military manpower of the world.⁸ Many states are friendly to the United States and its foreign policy goals: no non-Communist East Asian state participated in the 1980 Olympics in Moscow.

Strategically, the lines of communication through East Asia are of considerable importance to the United States, and of critical significance to Japan. The sea lanes through Southeast Asia, particularly the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Lombok, which


connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans, are the routes for the vessels of the Seventh Fleet, including the SSBNs and carriers, some 78 percent of Japan's petroleum requirements,⁹ and a large volume of other imports and exports. These passageways are also of considerable importance to the Soviet Union, whose naval vessels use them to transit from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean and back. Free passage through these waterways is critical to US naval strategy and the prosperity of Japan.

The ASEAN area of Southeast Asia is also strategically important to the United States because it contains suitable basing, staging, logistic, and communications facilities that could support military operations in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf as well as in East Asia and the Southwest Pacific. The naval and air force bases in the Philippines are especially important. According to an assessment in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*,

It is through Clark that the vital airborne supply pipeline runs from the US to forward military units throughout Asia and the Indian Ocean, and it is this pipeline which gives American units the ability to deploy swiftly to any trouble spot.¹⁰


In terms of geostrategic position, Northeast Asia is also a critical area. Vladivostok, the Soviets' only port which is open all year, and Petropavlovsk, the second port of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, are located here, as are the land-based aircraft which would provide the air cover necessary for the Soviet Navy to conduct military operations in the Pacific. Soviet vessels cannot reach the stations where they would be needed in time of war, however, without passing through relatively narrow straits controlled or potentially controllable by Japan and South Korea. The independence of Japan and South Korea under governments friendly to the United States, then, is not only important in American policy as an end in itself, but as a constraint on the operations of the Soviet Navy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Neither should the economic value of East Asia to the United States be discounted. Total trade with the region, as Figures 1 and 2 indicate, now surpasses trade with Western Europe and represents over one-fifth of total US international trade, although the United States still exports more to Western Europe than East Asia. Most of this trade is with Japan (54 percent of exports and 56 percent of imports from 1972 to 1978), with the share of the developing



Source: *Historical Statistics of the United States; Colonial Times to 1970*, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1976; and *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1973, 1978*, U.S. Department of Commerce.

Fig. 1—U.S. exports of merchandise to Europe and Asia, 1960-1977



Source: *Historical Statistics of the United States; Colonial Times to 1970*, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1975; and *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1973, 1976*, U.S. Department of Commerce.

Fig. 2—U.S. imports of merchandise from Europe and Asia, 1960-1977

countries of East Asia steadily increasing from 1972 to 1978.¹¹ US purchases from the region range from rubber, tin, and an increasing volume of petroleum and liquified natural gas, mostly from the ASEAN states, to television sets and automobiles, mostly from Japan. Increasingly, the most dynamic Asian economies—Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan—are replacing Japan as the source of textiles, electronic equipment, and other manufactured items. Imports accounted for 65.6 percent of the trade with the region in 1978, and have been over 54 percent every year since 1972. The United States has an unfavorable balance of trade with Japan, ASEAN, and the high growth economies of Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan.¹² US direct private investment in East Asia, although larger than in any other predominantly developing region except Latin America, is relatively small given the value of American trade with East Asia. At the year end, 1978, the Department of Commerce reported slightly more than \$11 billion US direct investment in East Asia, \$5 billion in Japan and approximately \$6 billion in the developing countries. By contrast, there was approximately \$70 billion invested in Western Europe, and over \$37 billion invested in Canada.¹³

Four formal allies of the United States—Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand—are located in the East Asia area, with mutual security obligations existing under each alliance except the US-Japanese agreement, under which Japan assumes no responsibilities for the defense of the United States or its possessions. The United States provides military aid, primarily on a credit basis, to the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. While not formally bound to protect these two latter states against aggression or externally aided insurrection, a series of policy statements issued over a long period of time suggest that the United States would provide, and would be expected to provide, some meaningful assistance to them (and Singapore and possibly the PRC as well).

Among other US interests in East Asia, the presence of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam deserves special mention. Between 1975 and the recent surge of refugees caused by the actions of Hanoi against ethnic Chinese and the fighting in Kampuchea, the United States accepted over 200,000 Indochina refugees.¹⁴ To relieve the plight of the boat people fleeing Vietnam in 1979 and the ASEAN nations who sometimes

unwillingly had granted them first asylum, the commitment was made to resettle 14,000 each month. The US need to deal with the refugee problem is obvious. Especially with the unexpected influx of over 90,000 persons from Cuba since May 1980, it could be extremely dangerous for the flow of Asian refugees into the country to continue, particularly in a period of serious economic difficulty.¹⁵

US SECURITY POLICIES TOWARD EAST ASIA

Nixon and Pacific Doctrines. Although there is no overarching strategic concept which applies to all of East Asia, two "doctrines" for the area have been applied in recent years which are apparently still applicable, at least in part. The first, promulgated at Guam in July 1969 by President Nixon, was intended to apply worldwide, but with

special meaning for East Asia. The President has stressed that the United States will remain a Pacific power and will continue to honor its commitments but will expect the Asian nations themselves to provide the primary manpower for their own defense.¹⁶

No subsequent official action or statement by the United States appears to have altered the Nixon Doctrine, although neither has it been seriously challenged by developments in East Asia since it was announced.

The second doctrine, issued 6 years later by President Ford, was described as a "Pacific doctrine of peace with all and hostility for none."¹⁷ It held that equilibrium in the Pacific was absolutely essential for all Pacific states, including the United States, and that American strength was essential for maintenance of the balance. The balance which President Ford described, and considered favorable, included "never better" relations with Japan, good and improving relations with China, and beneficial ties with the non-Communist regimes of Southeast Asia, not to mention the tested and enduring friendship with Australia and New Zealand. The President's only doubtful reference was to Korea and the possibility of a breach of the peace from the North.¹⁸ Clearly, the type of balance which President Ford approved was similar to the balance in a checkbook rather than the balance of a scale. While the President spoke of maintaining US military forces and

providing military assistance to allies and friends, there was an emphasis in his speech on economic and political cooperation as the preferred means of maintaining equilibrium. The Carter Administration did not issue its own doctrine for the area, and behavior and pronouncements indicated a general concurrence with the broad principles of the Pacific Doctrine, although it could be argued that President Carter initially wanted to give less emphasis to military strength than his predecessor. The environment has changed significantly, however, and, as has been indicated above, the United States is faced with a far less benign situation today than President Ford described in 1975. Faced with conflict in Indochina and more vigorous political and military roles by the Soviet Union in the region, military considerations appear to be receiving enhanced attention, although the importance of economic cooperation to stability in the area is also being stressed.

US Policy Toward Japan. Recent developments in US-China relations notwithstanding, officially the cornerstone of US security policy in Asia is Japan. Primarily symbolized and structured by the mutual security treaty signed by the two nations at the end of the American occupation in 1952, the United States agrees to protect Japan against attack, either nuclear or conventional. For its part, Japan has developed its own armed force, the Self-Defense Force, which is limited to defensive operations so as to qualify under Article 9 of its Constitution. This provision renounces "war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." Japan also provides military bases for use by the United States. As a practical matter, Japan has also felt obligated to accept the leadership of the United States in virtually all security matters, at least until recently.

There is a close interconnection between US-Japanese security relationships and US-Japanese economic relationships. Partially because it has been spared of the necessity to maintain and pay for larger armed forces (but largely for other reasons which have to do with conditions within Japan and the character of the Japanese economic system), Japan has established itself as the second strongest economy in the world after the United States, even though it can produce within its own boundaries virtually none of the resources required to maintain a modern economy. Security to Japan, then, does not only or mainly mean protection against foreign aggressor; security is also a question of securing access to

natural resources and markets without which contemporary Japan would be impossible. Besides providing physical security, the United States is the most valuable market for Japan: in 1977, over 25 percent of all Japanese exports were sold to the United States.¹⁹ Trade with Japan may be less directly related to security concerns in the view of most Americans, but there are definite links nonetheless. The favorable perception of the Japanese elite for the security pact with the United States depends in part on the satisfactory trading pattern. More importantly, support within the American public for the security guarantee to Japan is linked with Japanese trade, which has produced an unfavorable balance of trade for the United States for many years. Few Americans are familiar with the effects of continuing trade deficits, but when the imported products compete with American industries and appear to be a direct cause of unemployment, as currently is the case in the automobile industry, negative reactions are inevitable. Part of US security policy toward Japan—and Japanese security policy toward the United States—must be the manner in which the problems of bilateral trade are solved.

Apart from economic issues, the major current problem of US-Japanese security relations has to do with the size of the Japanese contribution to the mutual security effort. It is widely assumed in both Japan and the United States that the Carter Administration (and previous administrations, as a matter of fact) was dissatisfied with the contribution of Japan to defense.²⁰ Spending less than 1 percent of GNP on defense,²¹ Japan's expenditures for its armed forces are smaller, in a relative sense, than those of any other developed nation. In any case, the Japanese leadership has decided that the defense budget will be increased as a ratio of GNP, but only gradually and only by a small fraction. It has been reported that some Japanese have complained that Americans have pressed their argument too strongly and been too impatient due to ignorance about the need to build consensus in the Japanese political system.²² One contributing factor, probably not a major one, to the defeat of Prime Minister Ohira on a vote of no confidence in the Diet was precisely that he had agreed to increase defense expenditures without authorization from the legislature.²³

American Relations With South Korea. US relations with the Republic of Korea are closely interrelated with those towards Japan. More than any other single event, the Korean War provided

the stimulus for the security arrangement with Japan, as the presence of American units in Japan have given credibility to the commitments toward Korea. And while a few Japanese sometimes complain that US policy toward their nation is too much an outgrowth of the commitment to defend Korea rather than a commitment to Japan itself, most responsible Japanese believe that peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula under a friendly government, at least in the South, is essential for the security of Japan. Most observers would probably hold that the US commitment to defend South Korea, sometimes embarrassing to Washington because of the imperfect human rights record of the governments in Seoul, is really an extension of the fundamental requirement of postwar American policy that Japan be maintained as a prosperous, dynamic state aligned with the West. If this is true, it is also likely that the decisions of President Carter in July 1979 to suspend the withdrawal of US combat forces from Korea was as much directed toward the sensibilities of the Japanese as to the defense of Korea. In any case, the US commitment to assist in the defense of Korea and help deter an attack on Korea, formalized by treaty and reaffirmed by every American administration since Eisenhower, is a central feature of the US posture in Asia. With the North Korean armed forces, larger than the South's according to the latest estimates, deployed so that an attack could be launched with little warning, the alliance with South Korea is more likely to be tested by an aggressive action than any other. Events in South Korea since the assassination of Park Chung Hee, including the military takeover by General, now President, Chun Doo Hwan and the trial and conviction of opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, may endanger the maintenance of congressional and popular support for current policy. It calls for major security assistance to upgrade South Korean armed forces and deployment of the balance of the Second Division at Camp Casey until conditions justify its withdrawal.

US Security Policy Toward China and Taiwan. The security policy of the United States towards the People's Republic of China (PRC) will be treated briefly since space is limited, and other discussions of US policy toward the PRC have appeared in this series. Since normalization of relations, the United States has engaged in a strategic dialogue with the PRC on security problems, very visibly in the case of Afghanistan, and appears to have at least

minimally discussed its position with China on some aspects of refugee policy and Vietnam's continued occupation of Kampuchea. In a broad sense, US relations are obviously intended to serve American security interests with respect to competition with the Soviet Union on a global basis, if not also in East Asia. In the more narrow sense of formal security arrangements, however, there have been few actions on the part of either country beyond exchanges of military delegations and the American agreement to sell China certain articles of military support equipment and dual-use technology, and not to prevent the sale of weapons by American allies. These interactions may increase in the near future.

On January 1, 1980, the Mutual Defense Treaty agreement with the Republic of China on Taiwan was terminated. However, the United States had announced a year before, over Beijing's objections, that selected items of military equipment would continue to be sold to the government of Taiwan,²⁴ and that the United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves. Should the Beijing regime attempt to resort to military action to reunify Taiwan to the mainland, the United States would be placed in a very difficult position. Its statements, plus the presence on Taiwan of significant American economic assets, imply a definite response. Such could clearly jeopardize the carefully nurtured new relationship with Beijing and threaten the stability of Asia.

United States and Southeast Asia. After being the center of US Asian military policy for a decade, Southeast Asia assumed a low priority in Washington's security considerations after 1975 until the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1978. Of the Indochina states, diplomatic relations were maintained only with Laos, and there were very few contacts of any other kind except for sporadic and generally unproductive discussions with SRV on the status of persons missing in action and on the normalization of relations. US ties with the members of ASEAN were more extensive and productive, although the size of the military assistance groups in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand was reduced significantly and only halting progress toward an economic dialog between the United States and ASEAN was achieved.²⁵ The human rights policy of the Carter Administration caused some exasperation among ASEAN leaders; all

five nations (Malaysia and Singapore much less than the others) received criticism in the famous reports from the State Department to the Congress. As the tension in Indochina heightened, US policy toward ASEAN seemed to become more forceful and more positive. The Philippine Bases agreement was concluded, US-ASEAN talks in Washington were attended by the President and the Vice-President as well as the Secretaries of State and Commerce, and the United States took a prominent role in attempting to resolve the refugee problem. As the fighting in Kampuchea neared the Thai border, security assistance to Thailand was increased and expedited (although still modest compared to the 1960's), and security assistance for other ASEAN states also received sympathetic attention. Moreover, against the background of establishing full diplomatic relations with China and suspending the withdrawal of troops from Korea (which had caused considerable dismay among some ASEAN leaders), routine deployments of the Seventh Fleet in the area and regular affirmations of support for ASEAN and its members were awarded more attention and credibility than the same kinds of actions received a few years earlier. At least in terms of exhortation, the United States has also begun to encourage American private business to expand its activities among ASEAN states. ASEAN leaders would welcome more participation by US businesses both for its economic effects and as an indication that the United States intended to remain involved in Southeast Asia.²⁶

Aside from extending support to Thailand and providing humanitarian assistance and resettlement of refugees, the United States has avoided involvement in the current Indochina conflicts. According to Former Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke,

The interests of the United States are not immediately threatened, and we will not get directly involved in a conflict between Asian Communist nations. However, the continuation and possibly escalation of these conflicts between Communist states is potentially dangerous to the region. Therefore, we shall use whatever means are at our disposal to encourage restraint, bring an end to the fighting, and prevent a wider war.²⁷

While refusing to extend material support to the deposed Pol Pot regime, which the United States has branded as one of the most cruel of history,²⁸ America has consistently condemned Vietnam for its invasion of Kampuchea and for the policy which led to the mass exodus of ethnic Chinese and others from Vietnam into

Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and China. Generally, it has advocated the complete withdrawal of forces from Kampuchea, called for by the UN General Assembly resolution sponsored by ASEAN, before any negotiations concerning the future status of Kampuchea should begin. The United States criticized China's attack on Vietnam and has declined to endorse the continuing support by China of Pol Pot's forces on the Thai-Kampuchean border; obviously its position toward the participants of the conflicts has not been evenhanded or neutral: the actions of the Soviet-backed SRV are considered the more culpable and more antagonistic to US interests.

US POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE 1980's

US policies in East Asia during the coming decade will help shape the events which take place, but also will respond to events over which the United States has little or no control. The most destabilizing possible developments, for instance, would probably involve dramatic changes in the relations of China and the Soviet Union. Rapprochement or direct military conflict, neither probable nor infeasible, would so alter the present environment that current American policies might all become inappropriate. The implications of such possibilities are too complex for analysis in a general paper such as this. The following analysis instead will be limited to a general overview and a selected set of possible developments in East Asia during the 1980's and their interaction with US security policy, broadly defined, related to the status of Kampuchea; Japanese attitudes toward defense; political, economic, and military trends in Korea; and threats to internal political stability among non-Communist, developing states of the region.

Barring radical changes in the international environment, American security policy in East Asia (and elsewhere also) is likely to continue to be guided by the principles included in the Nixon and Pacific Doctrines. That is, the United States will pledge to keep its security commitments, but not to provide military personnel for combat (except perhaps in Korea and Japan); it will maintain a "strong" military presence within the region; and it will attempt to forge a favorable balance of power, particularly through the emerging relationship with China, utilizing political and economic

instruments of policy (tactics the Soviet Union cannot effectively imitate on a large scale) to the maximum extent possible. Without highly destabilizing and threatening developments, it is extremely difficult to imagine that another approach could gain congressional—indeed, administration—support. If these suppositions are correct, American decisionmakers will be concerned with such highly important but marginal questions as the levels of assistance required to be faithful to security commitments, the volume and quality of capabilities necessary to be militarily “strong” in East Asia, and what political and economic incentives and compromises are justified, especially with China and Japan, in order to forge a favorable balance of power. Whether or not an explicit human rights program institutionalized in a bureau of the State Department is retained throughout the decade, there will also almost certainly be an official continuation of concern for the human rights standards of East Asian governments, if only because Congress will insist upon it. One should assume, then, that American policies in the 1980’s, as in the 1970’s, will be marked by inconsistencies as decisionmakers attempt to reconcile the conflicting goals of extending human rights and supporting authoritarian regimes in the interest of security, among other dilemmas.

The Status of Kampuchea. As long as the conflict in Kampuchea continues, Vietnamese troops will continue to occupy the country, Thailand will continue to feel threatened, refugees will continue to seek food and safety in Thailand, and Vietnam will continue to be dependent on the Soviet Union for the military and economic support required to maintain its occupation forces. Current policies of the nations directly involved offer little promise of resolution. Thailand demands that Vietnam withdraw its forces and allow a nonaligned coalition regime to be formed in Kampuchea, while Vietnam insists that the formation of the new government is “irreversible” and that its army will remain as long as guerrilla forces continue to fight and receive support from Thailand. China, claiming complete solidarity with Thailand, nonetheless continues to provide assistance to the remnants of the Pol Pot regime through Thailand, and urges that no compromise with Vietnam is possible.²⁹ Beijing insists that Vietnam will only relinquish control over Kampuchea if the cost of continued occupation becomes too great because of casualties of men and equipment. Pol Pot must be

supported in spite of his record while in power, it is argued, because he has the only force which can impose a military penalty on Vietnam.

Even if the Chinese analysis were correct, the resulting solution might be unsatisfactory to several interested parties, including at least some ASEAN states and probably the United States, not to mention the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Hussein of Malaysia and President Suharto of Indonesia have hinted to Vietnam that a political solution to the Kampuchea situation might be acceptable to ASEAN even without a complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops if there were a substantial reduction of Soviet influence in Indochina.³⁰ Presumably these leaders are as concerned about the potential for instability with both the Soviet Union and China deeply involved in Indochina and the need for a strong (but not too strong) Vietnam to act as a buffer between China and ASEAN as they are worried about a direct Vietnamese threat to Thailand. As hinted by Former Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke, it appeared that the Carter Administration preferred a relatively early political settlement with Hanoi, even if the resulting Kampuchean government is friendly toward and perhaps dependent on Vietnam, if in the process Vietnam limits Soviet use of Cam Rahn Bay and Da Nang, does not pose a threat to Thailand, and continues to regulate emigration.³¹

Since the US involvement in the Kampuchean tragedy is peripheral, the US position taken on its solution may not be decisive. But the United States can provide—or withhold—one of the inducements which might convince the SRV to increase its distance from Moscow: normalization of relations and/or an agreement not to block economic assistance from international agencies or other Western nations—in the short run, Congress would not permit direct grants or loans, and might also require formal US opposition to aid from US-supported international lending agencies. Its influence might also be critical in persuading Thailand and China to accept a solution which resulted in a coalition government in Kampuchea with ties to Vietnam. There could be significant advantages from such a settlement in addition to those previously mentioned. Advocates of ultimate US-Vietnamese normalization of relations, who appear to include almost all American area specialists, assume that the Vietnamese leadership desires independence above most national values, and

will welcome the opportunity to reduce their present total dependence on Soviet assistance. Similarly, it is argued that when the Khmer Rouge has lost its source of sustenance through Thailand (which the Vietnamese would probably demand before they partially withdraw), Kampuchean nationalists will assert a meaningful degree of independence from Vietnam, so that Thailand would probably eventually obtain the buffer it desires. Depending on the specific terms of a compromise solution, the United States, Thailand, Vietnam, Kampuchea, and the other members of ASEAN could all benefit in a relative sense. A policy of normalization could be said to "take account of long-term basic trends in the economic and international politics of the region," something that has "so often been ignored" in the past.³²

If the assumptions in the preceding paragraph are accepted, China would gain also, since one result would be a reduced Soviet influence. Whether the Chinese leaders could perceive a solution which left Vietnam as the dominant power in Indochina as a satisfactory or even acceptable outcome is another question. Obtaining the acquiescence of Beijing to any settlement which denies it a strong influence in Phnom Penh might be the most difficult requirement of a negotiated agreement which ended the fighting in Kampuchea, provided for an efficient machinery to rehabilitate the Khmer people, and prevented the Soviet Union from obtaining a significant strategic advantage through the permanent use of Cam Rahn Bay and Da Nang. The big loser in such a compromise would be the Soviet Union, which might not willingly release Hanoi from its present dependency relationship or forego using Vietnamese military bases. However, if China's influence is also restrained in the final outcome, the Soviets might not resist too strenuously. They would no longer be required to provide a reported \$3 million per day in economic and military assistance, and presumably they would still retain significant, if greatly reduced, influence over Vietnamese decisions. The judgement by American decisionmakers of how the Soviet Union will react will doubtlessly help shape any US initiative. Of course, if the assumptions made about the independent spirit of the Vietnamese and Kampuchians are false, the policy being suggested here could be disastrous. However, the alternative seems to be an equally undesirable long period of instability in Indochina with the potential of escalating to a major conflict that feasibly might even involve the Soviet Union.

Japanese Attitudes Toward Defense. In the last few years, the taboo against discussing defense and military issues in the Japanese political system has disappeared. Issues are debated in the Diet, which now has a committee for defense matters,³³ and the Japanese Defense Forces are accepted by an overwhelming majority of the Japanese population.³⁴ In the recent past, it would have been unthinkable for Japan to have formal consultations with another government on military matters, but now Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation have been formally approved, and an official body for consultation exists and is functioning. In the opinion of virtually all observers, the trend awarding increasing legitimacy to defense efforts by the Japanese electorate and policymaking elite will continue, almost surely resulting in a somewhat larger defense budget, both in absolute and relative terms, and a posture in international affairs which is less dependent on US leadership and more self-assertive.³⁵

These changes in Japanese attitudes towards defense are at least partly the result of changing perceptions about the strategic balance and the military balance in Northeast Asia. While there are differing views about the relative military power of the United States and the Soviet Union, views that closely parallel and are based on arguments frequently articulated in the United States, the belief that there has been at least a relative decline in worldwide American military power, once thought to be overwhelmingly superior, is widespread. In their own region, Japanese observers have been impressed by the consistent qualitative and less significant quantitative improvements in the Pacific Fleet and the deployment of Soviet ground forces just across the strait from Hokkaido in the southernmost island of the disputed Kuril chain, while American naval capabilities appear not to have changed and the number of troops in South Korea has been decreased, albeit only by a small amount. Discussions in the press of plans to "swing" forces now deployed in Asia to Europe in case of war have done little to undermine these perceptions. While the 1980's may see some improvements to the Seventh Fleet and no diminishment of forces in Korea or elsewhere in the area, Soviet capabilities are expected to continue to be improved and political tensions with the Soviet Union are likely to remain so that the emerging consensus that the Soviet Union is a direct military threat to Japan is likely to become broader.

The consensus to improve Japanese Self-Defense Forces and defense cooperation machinery with the United States should be welcomed and encouraged by Washington, but with an appreciation that military issues are still extremely sensitive within Japan and that important decisions require a broad consensus not only within the ruling party and administrative structure but among opposition elements also.³⁶ The Japanese defense budget will probably exceed 0.9 percent of GNP only gradually, and it should not appear that the United States is trying to inappropriately pressure for a faster growth. Presently, there is widespread support for the US-Japanese security treaty, but the appearance that the United States is interfering in Japanese politics or acting without consultation when Japanese interests are involved might strengthen the position of those who want Japan to separate itself more decisively from the United States.

The upgrading of Japanese capabilities and the more urgent priority on defense cooperation with the United States will require American policy responses, especially in the negative sense that American forces in East Asia—particularly the capabilities of the Seventh Fleet and those based in Japan—are not reduced as Japanese forces improve. And any change in US deployments or in security policy toward South Korea must be preceded by thorough consultation. This will be important not only to retain a sense of credibility for the US security commitment among Japanese but also to reassure other East Asians as to American intentions to perform an active security role in the region and to protect Japan so major Japanese rearmament will be unnecessary. Elites of other East Asian nations, particularly ASEAN, “quietly approve,” as Former Under Secretary of State David D. Newsom put it, our security guarantee to Japan because they fear that otherwise Japan would extend its military capabilities into their part of East Asia, if only to protect its sea lines of communications.³⁷ Mutually satisfactory defense cooperation with Japan will be difficult unless the economic tensions associated with the bilateral balance of payments problem are managed to prevent political pressures which could degrade a close cooperation in all spheres.

America's alliance with Japan probably requires more reaffirmation and public attention than NATO because there is no common cultural heritage such as that which binds the United States and Western Europe, and the Japanese believe that the

absence of cultural affinity makes an alliance difficult to sustain, particularly on the part of the nation which must bear the heaviest current and potential costs. The Japanese are very aware of the differences between their society and US society, and they are aware of the widespread ignorance in the United States about Japan and Japanese culture. Too many Americans, even some who are involved with decisions which affect US-Japanese security relations, do not even realize that they do not understand Japanese patterns of communication and thinking. As younger Japanese leaders with relatively more nationalistic leanings than their elders emerge into positions of leadership, it will be increasingly urgent that American policy and policymakers be able to demonstrate the similarities between American and Japanese culture and a better comprehension and empathy for Japanese political culture.

Political, Economic, and Military Trends in Korea. The US security commitment to South Korea, like the commitment to Western Europe, is reinforced by the presence of American troops. Also like NATO, the health of the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea has implications which extend beyond the scope of Korean-American relations. At least since President Carter's initial decision to withdraw the Second Division from South Korea, East Asians have tended to view any real or imagined changes in US security policy toward Korea as measures of the credibility of the frequently repeated pledge that the United States will play a responsible role in the international politics of East Asia. As has been noted above, Japanese are particularly sensitive to American policy toward Korea. Other critics of US policy in Korea emphasize the inconsistencies between US declaratory policy on human rights and the reality of conditions in South Korea, and tend to use South Korea as an important symbol of the real meaning of US human rights policy. The existence of an authoritarian regime in South Korea continually serves as a catalyst to mount campaigns in Congress against continued military support of the South Korean armed forces and government. Since even imprisoned opposition leaders support the military presence in Korea, however, the security assistance program for Korea and the deployments of US forces may survive these attacks, but with diminished congressional and public support.

The solution to the present political crisis in South Korea cannot be predicted with certainty. There will be fewer problems for

American policy if martial law is quickly ended and a more democratic constitution is implemented, although such an outcome may be the least likely one. The course of economic developments is less uncertain. Assuming that order is maintained (whether through democratic or authoritarian controls is only marginally important in the short run), the South Korean economy will probably grow at about 7 percent, further increasing the disparity between the relatively stagnant, centralized North and the dynamic, free enterprise oriented South.¹⁸ Among other things, the continued prosperity of South Korea should allow the government, especially with American help, to match or surpass the very substantial military capabilities now possessed by North Korea during the 1980's, unless Pyongyang receives massive external assistance. Very probably, Korean exports to the United States will be competing with American production, strengthening demands for protectionist controls over imports into the United States, and probably strengthening the constituency asking to reduce US commitments overseas.

Assuming that North Korean military capabilities improve less rapidly than those of South Korea due to the variances in economic growth and that Kim Il Sung or his successors do not order an attack before South Korea's capabilities have been adequately strengthened, Washington will have to confront the issue of the presence of American troops, with all its wide-ranging implications, frequently throughout the 1980's. As the military balance shifts in favor of the South, the rationale for the same numbers of American troops and weapons to remain will become weaker, until it will be difficult to justify any military presence in Korea. This may not occur until after 1989. If South Korea is actually and apparently strong enough to defend itself against an invasion from the North, the withdrawal of US troops will not necessarily be interpreted as an indication of a lack of American commitment to the security of Asia as was the case in many East Asian capitals in 1977. But the nature and breadth of consultation before decisions are announced, the degree of flexibility of any withdrawal formula, the places where forces are redeployed, the international atmosphere in East Asia at the time, and the kind of reaction from the nations most immediately concerned—South Korea and Japan—will heavily influence perceptions throughout East Asia. To the degree that the decisions are viewed by East Asian leaders as

reasoned responses to changed conditions administered flexibly, with consultation at each phase, to that degree they should not reflect on American will or commitment in East Asia, especially if a significant portion of the forces withdrawn are retained in or close to East Asia. And, if these conditions are reasonably well met, the decision should not adversely affect the US-Japan security alliance too seriously.

US policy toward Korea will be heavily influenced by the decisions of Pyongyang and its allies. If North Korea seeks, and the Soviet Union and/or China provides, the assistance necessary to maintain a decisive military advantage over the South, and if tensions in the peninsula remain high, the United States will probably retain or supplement present deployments. However, Pyongyang's behavior will probably be ambiguous, expanding its capabilities to the limits of its economy, and perhaps also obtaining some outside assistance; as in the past, it will probably initiate peaceful overtones toward the South as it also continues to construct tunnels and infiltrate agents into South Korea. In the face of such ambiguity US policy will need to carefully balance between possible opportunities for a long-term solution on the peninsula and the immediate problems of South Korean security.

Threats to Internal Security. All of the states of East Asia except Japan are in a significant sense developing nations—their economic and political institutions have not matured, and many of their citizens are only beginning to be introduced to the complexities of modern, industrial societies and the world beyond their immediate villages and regions. The governments of these countries are subject to serious strains as new patterns of production and new social environments disrupt traditional values, and exposure to educational opportunities and the mass media create new, often unrealistic, expectations. There are likely to be situations in the states of East Asia in the 1980's which easily could result in coups d'etat, insurrections, or rebellions. With the exception of Malaysia,³⁹ the developing states of East Asia, including China, lack workable mechanisms for the orderly succession to political authority, as the recent upheaval in South Korea demonstrates, and all of them have aging leaders and will probably experience succession crises during the coming decade. Another cause of instability could be the presence of fairly large ethnic and cultural minorities with very weak loyalties to their nations and their

governments. The greatest danger may be in Malaysia, where communal strife between ethnic Chinese and ethnic Malays has placed the nation's existence in jeopardy before, and could do so again. Armed insurgencies conducted by minorities currently are being waged in Burma and the Philippines, and there are tensions which occasionally break into violence in other developing states. In Malaysia and Indonesia, where most of the population are Moslem, there also is a danger of a resurgent Islamic fundamentalism which could undermine the fragile constitutional consensus.

Serious domestic instability in many states of East Asia could endanger American interests. Yet, the developments and movements which result in internal turmoil rarely are amenable to decisive US influence. It may be possible for the United States to help governments prevent insurgencies by providing political, economic, and military support, particularly the capabilities required for the maintenance of internal security. To some degree, this has been done, and in most cases is being done, for all of the non-Communist regimes of East Asia.⁴⁰ Before the accession to power of Communist regimes, political, economic, and military support was also provided the leaderships of Kampuchea, Laos, and South Vietnam. Especially if the political and economic support includes advice and resources to deal with the causes of domestic discontent, such assistance may contribute to stability, both in the sense that government authority remains in essentially the same hands, and in the broader sense that governmental institutions are accorded legitimacy by increasing proportions of the populations. Unfortunately, US support may also help unpopular, oppressive regimes, which are closely identified with the United States in the minds of opponents and oppressed, to maintain themselves. The problem for US policymakers is to understand the politics of the developing nations of East Asia well enough to judge which groups will prevail, and how they can be influenced, if at all, to pursue policy most supportive of (at least policies least damaging to) US foreign policy objectives in the region. In countries where conditions make political instability likely, economic assistance deliberately designed to reach the poorest groups in the population (as US aid is now designed by direction of Congress) may be wise, in political and economic as well as moral terms, because such assistance may not be perceived as direct support for a given

government to the extent that dramatic demonstration projects funded by the United States may appear as direct support for a specific regime. Military assistance will inevitably relate the United States to the recipient regime, although good judgement and sound administration can sometimes save the United States from an unjustified identification with the objectionable policies of unpopular regimes if the effect of all US policies is balanced. In East Asia, several governments, especially South Korea and the Philippines, receive a great enough volume of security assistance to lead to such problems.

The United States can also contribute to the stability of the developing nations of East Asia by encouraging American business to participate responsibly in their economies. Of course, multinationals can damage host nation economies and create distrust for the United States. Corporate business behavior which includes training indigenous personnel and investing in accordance with locally established priorities, on the other hand, reflects favorably on the governments which charter and represent the business.

Unless there are crises in the region which impinge on US interests or unforeseen initiatives by other countries, then, American security policy decisions in the 1980's are not likely to be dramatic or radical (although recognizing Vietnam may appear to be a radical step by some observers), but rather marginal choices consistent with policies of the present and recent past. They will nonetheless be important, and could result in either the maintenance—or abandonment—of American economic and strategic interests, and the expansion or retraction of Soviet political and military influence, in East Asia.

ENDNOTES

1. As used in this paper, East Asia refers to those states normally included in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia: Burma, Indonesia, Kampuchea, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, China, Japan, and Taiwan.
2. Far Eastern Economic Review, *Asia Yearbook: 1980*, p. 43.
3. For example, see *Asian Security: 1979*, published by the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, p. 146; Bernard K. Gordon, "Loose Cannon on a Rolling Deck? Japan's Changing Security Policies," *Orbis*, Vol. 22, No. 4, Winter 1979, p. 967; and Richard H. Solomon, Chapter I: "American Defense Planning and Asian Security: Policy Choices for a Time of Transition," in Richard H. Solomon (ed.), *Asian Security in the 1980s: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition*, a report prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (R-2492-ISA), Santa Monica: RAND, November 1979, p. 4. In a recent tour of ASEAN capitals, most officials and analysts interviewed by this writer characterized US policy as vacillating and weak.
4. Khieu Samphan, Prime Minister of the still widely recognized government of Democratic Kampuchea (although presumably Pol Pot is still effective leader of the Khmer Rouge), claims to have 60,000 regular troops at his command. Most Western observers estimate that there are about 30,000. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 16, 1980, p. 15.
5. *New York Times*, May 23, 1980, p. A5.
6. Solomon, p. 3.
7. *Asia Yearbook: 1980*, p. 59.
8. *Military Balance: 1979-80*, pp. 96-97. The nations of East Asia are recorded as having 8,112,500 military personnel, excluding paramilitary forces and reservists.
9. *Asia Yearbook: 1980*, p. 204.
10. Michael Westlake, "Defense: The Gaps in Regional Security," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 16, 1980, p. 19.
11. *Direction of Trade Yearbook: 1979*, Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1979, pp. 269-270, p. 303.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Survey of Current Business*, August 1979, p. 27, Table 14—"US Direct Investment Position Abroad, Yearend 1978."
14. Richard C. Holbrooke, "East Asia: FY 1980 Assistance Proposals," *Department of State Bulletin*, April 1979, p. 19.
15. The many reports in the press of dissatisfaction about the presence of Cuban, and, to a lesser extent, Indochinese refugees, usually contain references to recession, high unemployment, and/or high taxes.
16. *United States Foreign Policy: 1969-1970*, a report of the Secretary of State, Department of State Publication 8575, General Foreign Policy Series 254, Washington: US Government Printing Office, March 1971, p. 35.
17. Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam (eds.), *American Foreign Relations 1975: A Documentary Review*, a Council on Foreign Relations book, New York: New York University Press, 1977, p. 547.
18. President Ford's speech is reprinted in *Ibid.*, pp. 547-552.
19. *Direction of Trade Yearbook: 1979*, p. 158.
20. However, Gordon, in the 1979 article cited in note 3 above, pp. 979-980, maintained that there was no evidence that a responsible American official had ever urged Japan to spend more on defense.

21. The Japan Defense Agency expenditures, which this year passed 0.9 percent of GNP (0.91 percent) for the first time, do not include the costs of retirement benefits. If they were included, the total would be closer to 1.5 percent, rather than 1 percent, of GNP. Moreover, it has been reported that some defense costs are hidden in nondefense areas of the budget. John Lewis, "Japanese Industry and the 1 Percent Military Solution," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 14, 1980, p. 59.

22. See Daniel I. Okimoto, "Security Policies in the United States and Japan: Institutions, Experts, and Mutual Understanding," in Franklin B. Weinstein and John W. Lewis (eds.), *US-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia: The Next Decade*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1978, pp. 9-36, especially p. 28ff.

23. John Lewis, "Growing Up in a World of Guns," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 16, 1980, p. 31.

24. Foreign military sales to Taiwan have in fact continued. On January 2, 1980, the Department of State notified Congress that it approved a package of equipment for Taiwan valued at \$280 million. Richard C. Holbrooke, "Review of Relations With Taiwan," *Department of State Bulletin*, August 2, 1980, p. 52.

25. For a discussion of US policy toward ASEAN during this period, see Thomas L. Wilborn, "ASEAN, 1985-2000: A US Role to Influence its Shape," *Parameters*, September 1978, pp. 23-25.

26. *Department of State Bulletin*, April 1979, pp. 23, 25-29.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

28. Some critics contend that the United States does support Pol Pot by accepting Democratic Kampuchea (DK) as the legal representative at the United Nations. The US position is that it is necessary to acknowledge DK's seat at the UN in order to properly condemn Vietnam and to show solidarity with the states of ASEAN.

29. When this essay was written (October 1980), there were some tentative indications of more flexible positions by both Vietnam and China, although the fundamental incompatibility which prohibited compromise was still present.

30. Richard Nations, "The Looming Split in the Five," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 20, 1980, p. 12.

31. Nayan Chanda, "No Peace Without Compromise," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 18, 1980, p. 8. Holbrooke's most explicit statement was in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on April 2, 1980.

32. William S. Turley and Jeffrey Race, "The Third Indochina War," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1980, pp. 92-116.

33. Henry Scott Stokes, "Japanese Establish Arms Policy Panel," *New York Times*, April 7, 1980, p. A10.

34. Foreign Press Center, Japan, "Summary of 'Defense of Japan'," by Defense Agency, July 28, 1978. The Self-Defense Forces received the approval of 83 percent of the population.

35. See Paul F. Langer, Chapter 4: "Changing Japanese Security Perspectives," in Solomon, pp. 69-90, for an excellent discussion of current Japanese attitudes toward defense.

36. Okimoto, pp. 19-21.

37. *Department of State Bulletin*, April 1979, p. 28.

38. Ron Richardson, "The Enemy: Park is Gone but Comrade Kim Is Very Much Alive," in "Focus South Korea '80," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 30, 1980, pp. 37-39, compares the economic situation and potential of the two Koreas briefly,

concluding that North Korea's economy can only recover if it cuts back on the size of its armed forces and the funds committed to defense. Mike Tharp, "South Korea's Problems: Cautious Optimism Felt," *New York Times*, September 22, 1980, pp. D1, D7, provides a more recent assessment of South Korea's economy.

39. There have been two transitions of power, both peaceful, within the dominant United Malay Organization and the Malaysian government since the independence of Malaya in 1957. In East Asia, only Japan, not considered a developing nation, has a better record.

40. US security assistance is provided all non-Communist East Asian nations except Burma. However, the security assistance programs in Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan are limited to cash FMS, and do not involve credits or grants.

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of action which, except for the Kampuchean problem, are consistent with recent and current policy. He suggests that a solution to the Kampuchean situation may require American initiatives, including normalization of relations with Hanoi.

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